Here is an extract of the ruling on "Padfield v. Minister of Agridulture, Fisheries and Food", rendered by Lord Reid (House of Lords and Privy Council, 1968). This extract came to my attention by chance some time ago. The House of Lords is the British equivalent of the Supreme Court of Canada.
Despite the fact that this ruling pertains to a rather technical case, that is the chalenge of a decision made by a Board regulating agriculture in England; the principle explored here appears to me to have a wide social bearing. It directly concerns, in my view, the responsibility of our governments towards the population.
This ruling causes me to become deeply thoughtful and appears sufficiently interesting to add it to our site.
| 1032, 1033 | HOUSE OF LORDS AND PRIVY COUNCIL | [1968] |
| H. L. (E.) 1968 ---------- Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ------ Lord Reid ---- |
... (the) Act imposes on the Minister a responsibility whenever there is
a relevant and substantial complain that the board are acting in
a manner inconsistent with the public interest, and that has been
relevantly alleged in this case. I can find nothing in the Act to
limit this responsibility or to justify the statement that the Minister
owes no duty to producers in a particular region. The Minister
is, I think, correct in saying that the board is an instrument
for the self government of the industry. So long as it does not
act contrary to the public interest the Minister cannot interfere. But if it does act contrary to what both the committee of investigation and the Minister hold to be the public interest the Minister has a duty to act. And if a complaint relevantly alleges that the board has so acted, as this complaint does, then it appears to me that the Act does impose a duty on the Minister to have it investigated. If he does not do that he is rendering nugatory a safeguard provided by the Act and depriving complainers of a remedy which I am satisfied that Parliament intended them to have. Paragraph 3 of the letter of May 1, 1964, refers to the possibility that, if the complaint were referred and the committee were to uphold it, the Minister "would be expected to make a statutory Order to give effect to the commitee's recommendations." If this means that he is entitled to refuse to refer a complaint because; if he did so, he might later find himself in an embarrassing situation, that would plainly be a bad reason. I can see an argument to the effect that if, on receipt of a complaint, the Minister can satisfy himself from information in his possession as to the merits of the complaint, and he then chooses to say that, whatever the committee might recommend, he would hold it to be contrary to the public interest to take any action, it would be a waste of time and money to refer the complaint to the committee. I do not intend to express any opinion about that because that is not this case. In the first place it appears that the Minister has come to no decision as to the merits of the appellants' case and, secondly, the Minister has carefully avoided saying what he would do if the committee were to uphold the complaint. It was argued that the Minister is not bound to give any reasons for refusing to refer a complaint to the committee, that if he gives no reasons his decision cannot be questioned, and that it would be very unfortunate if giving reasons were to put him in a worse position. But I do not agree that a decision cannot be questioned if no reasons are given. If it is the Minister's duty not to act so as to frustrate the policy and objects of the Act, and if it were to appear from all the circumstances of the case that that has been the effect of the Minister's refusal, then it appears to me that the court must be entitled to act. A number of authorities were cited in the course of the argument but none appears to me to be at all close to the present case. I must, however, notice Julius v. Bishop of Oxford because it was largely relied on. There the statute enacted that with regard to certain charges against any Clerk in Holy Orders it "shall be lawful" for the Bishop of the diocese "on the application of any party complaining thereof'' to issue a commission for inquiry. It was held that the words "it shall be lawful" merely conferred a power.
In Julius' case no question was raised whether there could be a discretion, but a discretion so limited that it must not be used to frustrate the object of the Act which conferred it; and I have found no authority to support the unreasonable proposition that it must be all or nothing -- either no discretion at all or an unfettered discretion. Here the words "if the Minister in any case so directs" are sufficient to show that he has some discretion but they give no guide as to its nature or extent. That must he inferred from a construction of the Act read as a whole, ... |
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The notion that in the frame of references of the British Act, to a power, a duty could be associated, is explored here exhaustively.
Considering this exploration, there is only one step to make to wonder if in other frames of references, to any power, a duty could be associated, and we quickly come to think that to any power, a duty should be associated.
I become deeply thoughtful when imagining the type of society we would have if the
principe explored here was generally applied.
